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Abstract 
The inadequate linkage of knowledge generation in agricultural research organizations with 
policy-making and economic activity is an important barrier to sustainable development and 
poverty reduction. The emerging fields of sustainability science and innovation systems 
studies highlight the importance of “boundary management” and “innovation brokering” in 
linking knowledge production, policy-making, and economic activities. This paper analyzes 
how the Papa Andina Partnership Program, based at the International Potato Center, functions 
as an innovation broker in the Andean potato sector. As a regional initiative, Papa Andina 
operates as a “second-level innovation broker,” backstopping national partners who facilitate 
local innovation processes in their respective countries. Papa Andina works to strengthen local 
innovation capacity and to foster “innovations in innovation” – the development of more 
effective ways of bringing stakeholders together to produce innovations that benefit small-
scale farmers. There are virtuous feedback loops between first- and second-level innovation 
brokering functions. The paper outlines the approaches Papa Andina has developed and 
promoted for fostering innovation brokerage at these two levels and the types of results 
obtained. It then identifies some important challenges that Papa Andina faces in innovation 
brokerage at the international level. The paper concludes with a discussion of broader policy 
issues related to the roles and functions of innovation brokers and boundary organizations in 
promoting sustainable development.  
Keywords: boundary organization; innovation broker; market chain development; 
multi-stakeholder platform; native potato; partnership; boundary management 
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1. Introduction 
This Working Paper deals with a central challenge facing international agricultural research 
organizations, including those affiliated to the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR): How to contribute significantly to sustainable development 
and poverty reduction while maintaining a focus on scientific research that produces 
international public goods (IPGs). A recent discussion paper produced by the Global Donor 
Platform for Rural Development and the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for 
Development (EIARD) (Ashley et al., 2009:1, 7) characterized the problem as follows:  
There has been a major tension between good science and applied agricultural 
research, in NARIs [national agricultural research institutes] and also within the CG 
system.  
Years of failing to respond to development needs have led to a situation where those 
engaged in planning agricultural and rural development often perceive research 
programmes of the NARIs, through to the CGIAR centres, to have limited relevance to 
the development agenda. 
The Working Paper focuses on an approach that international agricultural research centers and 
their national partners are experimenting with to link the worlds of research and action and 
promote pro-poor innovation: Partnership Programs that work to broker innovation processes, 
develop more effective ways of fostering innovation, and strengthen national innovation 
capacities.  
When the CGIAR system was established in the early 1970s, its mission was “to use the best 
science in advanced countries to develop technologies for the benefit of food deficit countries 
and populations” (Lele, 2004). Over time, as donor priorities shifted and the limitations of a 
narrow “pipeline” approach to productivity enhancement became apparent, the CGIAR 
mandate expanded to include poverty reduction and environmental protection. New research 
programs were added to address issues of food policy, institutional arrangement, and the 
management of water, forest, and fishery resources.  
The CGIAR’s current mission is to achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in 
developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and environment (www.cgiar.org). The research 
priorities include genetic improvement, sustaining agriculture biodiversity, the sustainable 
management and conservation of water, land and forests, improving policies and facilitating 
institutional innovation. Although these priorities cover a wide range of subjects, it is 
important to note that they are priorities for research, which aims to produce IPGs, taken to 
mean “research outputs of knowledge and technology generated through strategic and applied 
research that are applicable internationally to address generic issues and challenges consistent 
with CGIAR goals” (Harwood et al., 2006). The CGIAR Science Council encourages centers 
to focus on research that addresses problems of broad international importance and 
discourages them from engaging in applied research and development activities that address 
local problems (CGIAR Science Council, 2006). 
CGIAR centers have produced new knowledge and technologies that have helped to increase 
food production and reduce rural and urban poverty (Evenson and Gollin, 2003; Hazell, 2008; 
Kelly et al., 2008). Nevertheless, problems of poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation 
remain daunting in many developing regions (IAASTD, 2009). As Ashley et al. (2009) noted, 
despite substantial donor investment in agricultural research over many years, “many of the 
outputs of research have not impacted on poverty.”  
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Increasingly, those who provide funds for research expect their investments to benefit poor 
people (Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Consequently, there has been growing emphasis on 
“research for development” and a search for research and development (R&D) methods that 
ensure the relevance and use of research results. The increasing emphasis on research impact 
has challenged the status quo for research organizations and has stimulated a major reform 
process in the CGIAR system, which is presently underway (Ashley et al., 2009:3).  
Over the years, international agricultural research organizations have used a number of 
approaches to link research more effectively with development initiatives and farmers, 
including outreach programs, farming systems research, participatory technology 
development, networking, and partnership (Horton et al., 2009; Scoones and Thompson, 
2009). Recently, there has been experimentation with innovation systems approaches that shift 
attention from increasing the supply of new technology to facilitating innovation processes in 
which new solutions to technical and institutional problems are co-produced by diverse 
stakeholders in interactive learning processes. An innovation system can be defined as ‘‘a 
network of organizations, enterprises, and individuals focused on bringing new products, new 
processes, and new forms of organization into social and economic use, together with the 
institutions and policies that affect their behaviour and performance” (World Bank, 2007).  
Various factors can trigger innovation, including changes in policies, markets and technology. 
Attitudes and institutional structures determine how individuals and organizations respond to 
such triggers.  
Papa Andina is a Partnership Program hosted by the International Potato Center (CIP).2 Since 
its establishment in 1998, Papa Andina has worked with national partners in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Peru3 to promote innovation processes in market chains that benefit small-scale potato 
producers in highland areas (Devaux et al., 2009; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2009). In each country 
the national partners function as “innovation brokers” who facilitate innovation processes in 
potato market chains. These processes involve not only researchers, but also other agricultural 
service providers, policy-makers, small-scale farmers, and market agents. Papa Andina’s 
Coordination Team functions as a “second-level innovation broker” in that it supports and 
backstops the national teams, facilitates learning and knowledge sharing among them, and 
encourages the co-development of approaches and methods for improving innovation 
brokering processes at national level.  
Papa Andina and its partners have received national and international recognition and awards 
for their innovative work.4 Based on successful experiences in the Andes, some of Papa 
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 Through its Strategic Partners, Papa Andina works with a range of local partners in each country. Its Strategic 
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“for exploiting the diversity of native potatoes in expanding the competitiveness of products from the Andean 
region.” In 2007, INCOPA and Papa Andina won the international SEED Award for Entrepreneurship in 
Sustainable Development, an annual competition designed to support local, innovative partnerships in developing 
countries working to achieve poverty eradication and environmental sustainability (www.seedinit.org/about-the-
seed-awards/index.html). In 2007 INCOPA, A&L Exportaciones y Servicios SAC, Cadenas Productivas 
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Andina’s approaches have been applied by other groups to broker innovation processes in 
other value chains in the Andes and in other regions. Despite these achievements, however, a 
number of challenges remain. For example, a recent external evaluation noted that Papa 
Andina lacks a clear “theory of change” for its work. The evaluators also commented on the 
ambiguity of some of the roles and responsibilities of Papa Andina’s Coordination Team and 
those of its national partners, particularly with regard to responsibilities for achieving impact. 
There is also uncertainty about the future sustainability of Papa Andina and the functions it 
performs (Bebbington and Rotondo, 2010). As we will see in Section 2, evaluations of many 
other innovation brokers have reached similar conclusions. 
In this paper, after a brief review of the literature on “innovation brokerage” and the related 
topic of “boundary management,” we describe the development of Papa Andina as an 
innovation broker. We then describe the approaches it has used to broker innovation 
processes, the types of results obtained, and the challenges it faces as an innovation broker. 
Based on the Papa Andina case, as well as prior research, we close with a discussion of policy 
issues related to the role of innovation brokers in linking research with action to support 
sustainable development and in catalyzing pro-poor innovation processes in other settings.  
2. Boundary Management and Innovation Brokerage 
This section presents highlights of recent applied research on “boundary management” and 
“innovation brokerage.” Much of the literature on boundary management is associated with 
the work of the Sustainability Sciences Program at Harvard University’s Center for 
International Development.5 The literature on innovation brokerage, in the field of innovation 
systems studies, has been summarized by Klerkx et al. (2009).  
2.1. Boundary management  
In their report on a major study of knowledge systems for sustainable development, Cash et al. 
(2003:8086) emphasized the importance of boundary management:  
This study suggests that efforts to mobilize S&T [science and technology] for 
sustainability are more likely to be effective when they manage boundaries between 
knowledge and action in ways that simultaneously enhance the salience, credibility, 
and legitimacy of the information they produce. Effective systems apply a variety of 
institutional mechanisms that facilitate communication, translation and mediation 
across boundaries.  
The study found that scientific information is effective in influencing decision-making so long 
as it is seen as credible, salient, and legitimate. In this context, credibility refers to the 
perceived scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and arguments; salience relates to the 
relevance of the information to the needs of decision-makers; and legitimacy reflects the 
perception of stakeholders that the information was produced in a way that was “respectful of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Agricolas de Calidad (CAPAC) Perú, Supermarket Wong, producer organizations, and Papa Andina won the 
World Challenge Award, a competition sponsored by BBC World News and Newsweek, in association with 
Shell, that rewards projects or small businesses that have shown enterprise and innovation at a grassroots level 
(www.theworldchallenge.co.uk/previous-winners.php). In 2008 INCOPA and Potato Andean won Peru’s Ardilla 
de Oro, awarded annually by Peru’s Catholic University for a marketing campaign that contributes to social 
development in Peru (www.infoandina.org/node/26072).  
5
 www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/programs/sustsci. 
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stakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of 
opposing views and interests” (Cash et al., 2003). 
The credibility, salience, and legitimacy of information are tightly linked in the sense that an 
increase in one of them generally comes at the expense of a reduction in the others. For 
example, if efforts are made to maximize the relevance of information for decision-makers, 
methodological shortcuts might be made that reduce the credibility of the findings. Similarly, 
use of state-of-the-art research methods that maximize the credibility of research results might 
alienate decision-makers who do not understand the methods used (therefore reducing 
legitimacy) or delay the delivery of results until they are no longer relevant or useful to the 
decision-makers.  
Cash et al. (2003) identify three key functions that contribute to effective boundary 
management:  
• Communication. Active, iterative, and inclusive communication between researchers 
and decision-makers is crucial in efforts to mobilize knowledge in the service of 
practical action  
• Translation. Understanding between experts and decision-makers is often hindered by 
jargon and differing assumptions about what constitutes a persuasive argument. For 
this reason, translation is often needed to ensure that participants from different 
institutional settings understand each other 
• Mediation. Although communication and translation are essential for effective 
information flows between researchers and decision-makers, they are seldom enough 
to ensure that research influences decision-making. Because stakeholders often have 
conflicting interests, mediation is usually needed for mobilizing science for practical 
action 
Boundary management functions can be carried out effectively through various organizational 
arrangements and procedures, but are frequently performed by “boundary organizations” 
responsible for managing one or more specific boundaries. Although they have lines of 
responsibility and accountability to groups on both sides of the boundary, these organizations 
can provide a forum or “safe space” in which members from participating organizations can 
come together to discuss and negotiate problems and solutions.  
Empirical studies of boundary management show that “not all organizations that bring 
together divergent perspectives necessarily result in anything new or better” (Schneider, 
2007:60). Successful boundary organizations tend to exhibit an inclusive leadership and 
management style (Schneider, 2007:76) that facilitates the co-production of plans, strategies, 
models, methods, or reports that are viewed as salient, credible, and legitimate by those 
involved and by their organizations. Studies also highlight the important contribution made by 
particular individuals, known as boundary agents, who play key roles in “creating and 
sustaining relationships, building trust, communicating information needs and concerns, and 
bridging gaps between various stakeholder groups (McNie et al., 2008:2; see also Kristjanson 
et al., 2009 and Reid et al., 2009).  
2.2. Innovation brokerage6 
Insights from the literature on industrial and agricultural innovation have recently been 
brought together within the concept of agricultural innovation systems (Klerkx et al., 2009). 
The World Bank (2007:6-7) defines an innovation system thus: 
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An innovation system may be defined as comprising the organizations, enterprises and 
individuals that together demand and supply knowledge and technology, and the rules 
and mechanisms by which these different agents interact. The innovation systems 
concept focuses not merely on the science suppliers but on the totality and interaction 
of actors involved in innovation. It extends beyond the creation of knowledge to 
encompass the factors affecting demand for and use of new and existing knowledge in 
novel and useful ways. Thus, innovation is viewed in a social and economic sense and 
not purely as discovery and invention. 
Klerkx et al. (2010:390) note that “in the AIS [agricultural innovation systems] approach, 
innovation is considered the result of a process of networking and interactive learning among 
a heterogeneous set of actors, such as farmers, input industries, processors, traders, 
researchers, extensionists, government officials, and civil society organizations.”  
One implication of innovation-systems thinking is that the innovation capacity of a country’s 
agricultural sector depends on: the extent of shared visions; effective linkages and information 
flows among public and private actors; incentives for cooperation; adequate marketing, 
legislative, and policy environments; and well-developed human and organizational capital 
(Hall, 2006; Gijsbers, 2009; Klerkx et al., 2009).  
Past efforts to strengthen agricultural innovation systems focused mainly on training and 
organizational capacity development (Horton et al., 2003). Attention is now shifting towards 
improving incentives for cooperation and strengthening linkages among relevant actors. The 
importance of having intermediary organizations that link the various actors involved in 
innovation is becoming recognized (Szogs, 2008; Klerkx et al., 2009; Kristjansonet al., 2009). 
These intermediaries have been referred to as “innovation intermediaries” or “innovation 
brokers”.  
Howells (2006:720) defines an innovation intermediary as “an organization or body that acts 
as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process between two or more parties”. 
The provision of brokerage and mediation services might or might not be the primary role of 
an innovation intermediary. For example, a research or extension organization might, as a 
sideline, broker innovation in some of its projects. Winch and Courtney (2007:751) define an 
innovation broker more narrowly as “an organization acting as a member of a network … that 
is focused neither on the organization nor the implementation of innovations, but on enabling 
other organizations to innovate”.  
Klerkx et al. (2009:413) identify three main functions of an innovation broker: 
• Demand articulation: Articulating innovation needs and visions and the corresponding 
demands in terms of technology, knowledge, funding and policy 
• Network composition: Facilitating linkages among relevant actors 
• Innovation process management: Enhancing alignment in heterogeneous networks of 
actors with different objectives, institutional norms, values, incentives, and reward 
systems. This is a continuous activity that involves boundary management, translation, 
and mediation to build trust, establish working procedures, foster learning, and 
manage conflict and intellectual property 
A number of risks and challenges to effective innovation brokerage have been identified in the 
literature, which Klerkx et al. (2009:414-415) summarize in three points: 
Tensions over legitimacy. The legitimacy of an innovation broker depends on the extent to 
which stakeholders consider the broker to be a relatively neutral “honest broker”. Neutrality is 
never absolute “because brokers always exercise a certain degree of steering”, but the degree 
of steering needs to be acceptable to those involved in the innovation process. To minimize 
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tensions over legitimacy, brokers should avoid taking over management and ownership of the 
innovation process from innovation network partners, and should attend to the goals and 
interests of each partner. Tensions are inevitable in innovation networks because innovation 
tends to challenge current practices and the participants often have conflicting interests.  
Ambiguity of functions. Innovation brokers and intermediaries are often linked to research 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or donors, which can lead to 
confusion or ambiguity about their role in the innovation process. Due to this association with 
parent organizations engaged in research or other activities, other participants in innovation 
networks sometimes view innovation intermediaries as competitors for resources rather than 
neutral facilitators.  
Intangible effects / unwillingness to pay. Assessing the impact of innovation brokers is 
difficult because of the indirect and intangible results of their work. They do not produce 
technologies or innovations, but work to improve the performance of innovation systems 
composed of other actors. The difficulty in assessing the impact of innovation brokers applies 
both ex-ante (making it difficult to justify allocating funds to brokerage activities) and ex-post 
(making it difficult to demonstrate “proof of concept” through the documented impact of 
successful brokerage). The current emphasis on logframe-based planning and evaluation, 
“hard” and “SMART”7 indicators, and short-term results all exacerbate this problem, as 
funders aim to support the production of tangible outputs in short-term projects (rarely more 
than 3-5 years). Innovation brokers need more time to establish themselves and produce 
significant results in terms of strengthened capacity and improved performance of local 
agricultural innovation systems. Similar difficulties in acquiring funding for boundary-
spanning activities that support innovation processes have been reported in the CGIAR 
(Kristjanson et al., 2009:5052).  
2.3. Implications for CGIAR-based innovation brokers  
The literature on boundary management and innovation brokerage reviewed in Sections 2.1 
and 2.2 is overlapping and complementary in many respects. In this section we bring together 
some major themes from the two sets of literature that are relevant for analyzing Papa Andina 
and other boundary organizations that are attached to CGIAR centers and that function as 
innovation brokers. 
An innovation broker can be viewed as a type of boundary organization that specializes in 
brokering or facilitating innovation processes involving several other parties, but does not 
itself engage in the innovation process. The main functions of an innovation broker are to 
facilitate the following processes:  
• articulation of demands for innovation and technology 
• creation of effective innovation networks 
• management of innovation processes 
In performing these functions, innovation brokers need to pay particular attention to ensuring 
that all network members consider the information generated and exchanged to be salient, 
credible, and legitimate. Given the inherent tradeoffs between these information 
characteristics, innovation brokers need to skillfully balance the diverse information needs 
and standards of different groups. They should also be skillful in communicating technical 
and non-technical information, translating it effectively (so that it is understood by parties 
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from different institutional and cultural backgrounds), and mediating between participants 
with different, and often conflicting, interests and agendas.  
International agricultural research and innovation tend to be characterized by a range of 
challenging traits: “immature” and highly fractured national innovation systems in developing 
countries; weak capacity at the level of individual organizations performing various R&D 
functions; weak or unproductive inter-organizational relationships often characterized by 
mistrust; significant language and cultural differences between the diverse groups in the 
private, public, and non-governmental sectors and those operating at local, national, and 
international levels; significant imbalances in power and access to resources, especially 
between “northern” and “southern” partners (with CGIAR centers typically falling into the 
“northern” category); and considerable variation in all these traits from region to region, 
country to country, and sector to sector.  
Innovation brokers attached to or associated with CGIAR centers can be considered “second-
level innovation brokers” in that they do not facilitate national- or local-level innovation 
processes, but support the work of national and local partners who take the lead in brokering 
innovation processes in their countries. In this context, a key role for a second-level 
innovation broker attached to a CGIAR center could be to facilitate the co-production of new 
approaches and methods for improving innovation processes. 
The traits listed highlight the need for CGIAR-based innovation brokers to balance competing 
demands. On one hand, they need to establish themselves as “honest brokers,” trusted to 
negotiate fair deals among diverse actors with different objectives and interests. On the other 
hand, however, they need to steer innovation processes in ways that strengthen national 
innovation capacities. This often involves pushing for the expansion of an innovation network 
in ways that traditional partners might find threatening. Second-level innovation brokers 
therefore need to balance their roles as honest brokers in negotiation and as advocates for 
capacity strengthening.  
CGIAR-based innovation brokers are often expected to provide specialized scientific 
information for decision-making. Playing such an “expert” role, however, conflicts with 
serving as an independent process facilitator. It also increases the risk that the CGIAR center 
begins to dominate local innovation processes, rather than playing a backstopping role.  
To effectively help strengthen local innovation capacity, center-based innovation brokers need 
to work behind the scenes and promote the achievements of local actors (Horton et al., 2003). 
Playing such an invisible and catalytic role, however, makes it difficult to assess their results 
and measure “tangible impact” or “value added.”  The consequent lack of hard evidence could 
jeopardize obtaining funding support for innovation brokers.  
Klerkx et al. (2009:432) note that “innovation brokers … always have to perform a balancing 
act.” For the reasons outlined in this section, CGIAR-based innovation brokers need to be 
particularly adept at balancing conflicting needs, priorities, and agendas.  
3. The Papa Andina Initiative 
Much of the literature on boundary management and innovation brokering is abstract, and 
there are few detailed case studies on the structures of boundary organizations or the 
approaches used by innovation brokers to facilitate innovation processes and strengthen 
innovation capacities. In this section, we analyze four aspects of Papa Andina’s evolution as a 
second-level innovation broker:  
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• its shift in focus (and paradigm) from regional research to regional learning and 
innovation brokering  
• how it is structured and its relationship with first-level partners  
• the approaches it has developed to facilitate innovation processes and strengthen 
national innovation capacities 
• the types of results it has achieved through its work with national partners 
3.1. Shift in focus from research to learning and innovation  
Papa Andina was designed to strengthen potato research capacity in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru through the development of a regional research program. In line with the CGIAR 
strategy at the time, outlined by de Janvry and Kassam (2004:159), it sought to develop “a 
regional approach to research planning, priority setting and implementation” involving CIP’s 
traditional research partners in the Andes – the national potato research programs.  
It soon became clear, however, that national policy-makers and potato researchers were less 
interested in developing a regional potato research program than in coping with external 
forces that were buffeting their organizations. Production-oriented agricultural research had 
fallen out of favor with international donors and national governments, research funding was 
falling precipitously, and market-chain approaches were being promoted as part of a new 
development agenda that researchers found alien and threatening.  
To address these issues, Papa Andina linked up with the New Paradigm Project of the 
International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) (de Souza Silva, 2001; de 
Souza Silva et al., 2001), which offered a theoretical framework for understanding and 
managing organizational change. The framework emphasized that research organizations 
operate in highly dynamic environments and need to anticipate and respond with agility to 
changing demands and opportunities for their services.  
Encouraged by these ideas, Papa Andina gradually shifted its focus from devising a regional 
research agenda to developing a regional learning agenda and strengthening national 
capacities for innovation, making use of resources in the region, incorporating new ideas, and 
adapting them to local circumstances. This shift involved developing and using participatory 
approaches, facilitating teamwork and group decision-making, and collaborating with new 
types of partners outside the usual circle of research organizations. The changes took some 
time to be incorporated into the way Papa Andina and its partners worked. The co-
development of several approaches for facilitating innovation (described in Section 3.3) was 
central to moving from a focus on research to one on learning and innovation.  
The shift in focus was radical, and continues to be controversial within the international 
agricultural research community. For example, a recent review of social sciences in the 
CGIAR notes that “IS [innovation systems] theory remains underdeveloped and exceedingly 
difficult to operationalize empirically … we see only a very limited role for this line of 
research within CGIAR social science while the concepts and methods remain seriously 
underdeveloped and the CGIAR lacks appropriately trained staff to enjoy a high likelihood of 
generating breakthroughs” (CGIAR Science Council, 2009). 
3.2. Organizational structure and relationships with partners 
Papa Andina began as a CIP project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). It has evolved into a Partnership Program with different donors, and 
spans the institutional boundaries of CIP and R&D partners in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
Over the years, Papa Andina has managed a portfolio of complementary donor-funded 
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projects that aim to stimulate pro-poor innovation and develop national innovation capacities 
in the potato sector. All its work has been funded through donor projects, rather than through 
CIP’s core budget.8 
Papa Andina is part of CIP’s research structure, which is made up of Research Divisions and 
Partnership Programs (CIP, 2004:59). Partnership Programs are characterized by the direct 
involvement of partners in program governance and implementation. Papa Andina has its own 
advisory body – the Coordination Committee – that includes representatives of its Strategic 
Partners, its Coordination Team, CIP, SDC, and the agricultural sector in each country. This 
creates multiple lines of accountability between Papa Andina and its main stakeholders. It also 
reports through CIP’s management system. Some of its approaches and innovative strategies 
for linking research with action and some of the results achieved in the Andes have been 
reported as CIP outputs and outcomes, and are becoming part of CIP’s research strategy. 
Papa Andina’s Coordination Team is made up of CIP staff members and consultants based in 
Peru (3), Bolivia (2), and Ecuador (1). The Papa Andina Coordinator, who is based in Lima, 
Peru, makes frequent trips to field sites in all three countries and the management style is 
markedly “horizontal” (Bebbington and Rotondo, 2010: 36). Major decisions are made at 
Papa Andina’s annual meetings or at meetings of the Coordination Committee. 
The Coordination Team works closely with focal points and collaborators in one R&D 
organization in each country. Known as “Strategic Partners”, these organizations are: the 
PROINPA Foundation in Bolivia; the National Potato Program at INIAP in Ecuador; and the 
INCOPA Project in Peru.9 The team members are based at CIP or with the Strategic Partners. 
This facilitates communication between the team and the partners, but “in some cases this co-
location may have weakened the independence of the coordination team and created 
uncertainty in the eyes of stakeholders as to institutional identities” (Bebbington and Rotondo, 
2010: 37). 
Most of Papa Andina’s work in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru is led by the Strategic Partners and 
is implemented directly by them or via local organizations known as “Operational Partners” 
(Figure 1). In this sense, therefore, Papa Andina operates as a second-level innovation broker. 
Its Coordination Team is not directly involved in brokering in-country innovation processes. 
Instead, it works to support and co-fund the Strategic Partners by creating an appropriate 
environment or “innovation ecology”, facilitating the implementation of innovation processes 
in each country, and acting as a “broker of innovations for innovation.”10 The main types of 
support that the Coordinating Team provides are methodology development and support for 
innovation brokering, knowledge sharing through regional activities, and grants for operations 
in each country.  
                                                
8
 A CGIAR center’s “core budget” is unrestricted in the sense that center management has discretion over the use 
of the funds to implement the center’s program. In contrast, “project funds” must be used according to 
agreements between the center and the donor that specify budgets, output and impact targets, and timelines.  
9
 The organizations’ names in Spanish are: Fundación PROINPA (Promoción e Investigación de Productos 
Andinos), Bolivia (www.proinpa.org/); Programa Nacional de Raíces y Tubérculos rubro Papa (PNRT-Papa), 
INIAP, Ecuador (www.iniap-ecuador.gov.ec/); and Proyecto INCOPA, Perú 
(www.cipotato.org/papandina/incopa/incopa.htm), a coalition of private and public partners that aims to improve 
small potato farmers’ access to markets. 
10
 For a discussion of this term, and some examples, see Hall (2003).  
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Figure 1: Interaction mechanisms among key actors in the Papa Andina  
Partnership Program 
A key Papa Andina strategy is to strengthen the innovation capacity of national partners by 
delegating responsibilities and authority to them. An external evaluation of Papa Andina 
found that country-level activities were so closely associated with the Strategic Partners that 
many Operational Partners, producers, and other stakeholders knew little, if anything, about 
Papa Andina, and assumed that they were participating in or benefiting from the activities of 
PROINPA, INIAP, or INCOPA (Bebbington and Rotondo, 2010:38).  
3.3. Approaches for brokering innovation processes 
Papa Andina has developed and promoted several R&D approaches for brokering innovation 
processes and strengthening national innovation capacities. At this level, it promotes 
“innovations in innovation”, as described in Section 3.4. Some of these approaches are 
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outlined here and have been taken up by other organizations involved in brokering innovation 
in other settings.  
Going beyond the “HYV technology regime” 
The CGIAR is best known for the “Green Revolution” of the 1970s, which ushered in the use 
of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of staple food crops along with chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides. Green Revolution technology boosted crop production and yields on irrigated land, 
contributing to significant reductions in food prices. Early success with the technology helped 
consolidate an “HYV technological regime” in the CGIAR, which prizes breeding and genetic 
engineering over other more holistic approaches, such as integrated natural resources 
management and agro-ecology, which are more closely associated with concepts involved in 
evolutionary thinking, systems analysis, complexity, and innovation (Vanloqueren and Baret, 
2009).  
Whereas modern high-yielding potato varieties have been introduced into many parts of the 
Andes, native varieties (landraces) still predominate on small farms in areas above 3,500 
meters in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Until recently, native potatoes received almost no 
attention in potato research agendas. And yet, with their diversity in color and shape, high 
cooking versatility, nutritional profile, and traditional, low-input production practices, native 
potatoes represent a valuable asset for small-scale farmers in the region (Ordinola et al., 2007; 
Meinzen-Dick et al., 2009). As they grow best at the higher altitudes where small-scale 
farmers predominate, using them in the development of new commercial products should give 
these farmers a comparative advantage. Based on a market study that indicated untapped 
market potential for native potato products in Peru, Papa Andina began exploring ways to 
exploit the potential of native potatoes through new product development, resulting in  several 
new products being developed and marketed in Bolivia and Peru. In Ecuador, where native 
potatoes have almost disappeared from the market, efforts have remained focused on 
improving small-scale farmer access to markets for modern potato varieties.  
Papa Andina’s experience with native potatoes illustrates that innovation brokers need to 
avoid being constrained by the prevailing research agenda and dominant technological 
regime. Successful pro-poor innovation needs to begin with an understanding of the assets, 
perspectives, and needs of key stakeholders in the innovation process – especially those of 
small-scale farmers and market agents – and then building on this understanding. The main 
approach that Papa Andina has developed for initiating innovation processes that capitalize on 
local assets and address local needs is the Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA), 
described here. 
The Participatory Market Chain Approach 
In 2003, in order to stimulate agricultural innovation, Papa Andina and CIP’s Social Science 
Department began to use a participatory approach known as Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural 
Knowledge Systems (RAAKS) (Engel and Salomon, 2003). RAAKS brings diverse 
stakeholders together to stimulate social learning, build trust, and foster innovation. Papa 
Andina used RAAKS to bring market chain actors together to identify and develop market 
opportunities that could be of mutual benefit. Rapid market assessments and focus group 
approaches were added, and gradually a new approach emerged, known as the Participatory 
Market Chain Approach.11 The PMCA seeks to build trust and connectedness and to facilitate 
the acquisition of useful knowledge, skills, and attitudes for innovation. One of its goals is to 
foster relationships that continue after the completion of the specific PMCA application.  
                                                
11
 The PMCA methodology has been documented in Spanish and English in User Guides and Training Guides 
(Bernet et al., 2006, 2008).  
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Box 1: Applying the PMCA to unleash the potential of native potatoes in Peru 
Papa Andina applied the PMCA in Peru with researchers, farmers, private companies, and 
nutritional and gastronomic experts to find innovative ways to expand the market for native 
potatoes through product development. 
Early products opened new market niches and brought higher prices for farmers. Among these 
were T’ikapapa (bagged native potatoes), which received the prestigious BBC World Challenge 
Award and the UN Seed Award, and Jalca Chips (multicolored native potato chips), which took off 
in the duty-free shops at Lima airport. As visibility and interest in native potatoes rose, Papa 
Andina worked with small-scale farmers, NGOs, and large multinationals to develop more 
products, while boosting the bargaining power and participation of local farmers. As a result, a 
supply chain has been created that gives more than 200 farmers access to a stable market and a 
negotiated price that provides them with a 20-40% profit margin. Export channels are opening, 
too, and in 2009 the overall demand for native potatoes in Peru was estimated to have reached 
2000 metric tons, generating close to $US1 million in revenues for farmers.  
The emergence of a native potato market has fueled the research agenda. CIP scientists, along 
with NGOs and farmers, are working on ways to increase quality and yield while safeguarding the 
sustainable and natural production methods valued by consumers.  
An important aspect of consolidating the market is to position the native potato on the political 
agenda. Interested stakeholders have linked up to form lobbying platforms, recording successes 
such as the creation of National Potato Days in Peru and Ecuador and the compilation of quality 
norms for potatoes and their processing. A CIP-led “vision exercise” implemented in Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru, involving public and private sector representatives, identified opportunities for 
public and private investment to increase the competitiveness of the sector as a whole, with the 
focus on small-scale farmers.  
The PMCA engages those who make their living from a market chain (‘market chain actors’) 
and public and private service providers (such as researchers, credit providers and 
development workers) in facilitated group processes in which market opportunities are 
identified and assessed and innovations are developed. The objective is to stimulate 
commercial innovation (such as the development of new products or the identification of 
market niches). Experience has shown that developing new products or identifying new 
markets stimulates institutional innovation (such as the creation of new supply channels) and 
technological innovation (such as improved potato production methods).  
An R&D organization initiates the PMCA process by identifying key market chain actors and 
supporting organizations, and by conducting market research to learn about these actors and 
their activities, problems, and priorities. Thematic groups are formed that focus on market 
opportunities, and facilitators lead group meetings to analyze the opportunities and conduct 
the R&D activities needed to develop specific innovations.  
As the process advances, the aim is for the facilitator to hand over responsibilities to the 
market chain actors. This has often proven difficult, however, and R&D organizations have 
found it necessary to continue in a facilitating mode.  
In promoting and supporting the use of the PMCA, Papa Andina’s partners play the role of 
innovation broker. Key facilitation functions involve:  
• encouraging relevant actors to participate in the PMCA process (network formation) 
• ensuring effective communication and mutual understanding among the diverse groups 
implementing the PMCA (communication and translation) 
• mediating conflicts, which are often inevitable during market-chain innovation 
• catalyzing problem-solving when groups get stuck, often by linking to external sources 
of expertise (boundary spanning) 
• In order to consolidate the innovation processes initiated through the PMCA and to 
promote the scaling up of its interventions with partners, Papa Andina has developed 
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complementary approaches focusing on stakeholder platforms, policy dialogue, 
corporate social responsibility, and horizontal evaluation. 
 
Box 2: The Bolivian Andean Platform (ANDIBOL): Result of the PMCA and 
innovation platform in its own right 
ANDIBOL provides an example of a multi-stakeholder platform that emerged from an innovation 
process triggered by use of the PMCA, and which itself has stimulated further innovation.  
Farmers who produce native potatoes above 3,500 meters in altitude in the Bolivian highlands 
are among the poorest people in Latin America. Native potatoes (landraces) and the local 
knowledge for their cultivation and transformation are among the main assets possessed by 
farmers in these areas. Traditional freeze-dried potato products known as chuño and tunta are 
typically used for home consumption, intra-household exchange, and trade in local markets. The 
ANDIBOL platform – an alliance of small potato producers, R&D organizations, NGOs, and 
medium-scale enterprises – was established to promote the development and exploitation of 
market niches for chuño in demanding urban markets.  
In 2003, PROINPA used the PMCA to foster innovation in the market chains for tunta and chuño. 
This work involved farmers, traders, food-processing firms, exporters, cooking schools and R&D 
organizations. In the first cycle, participants prepared a set of Bolivian Quality Standards for 
Chuño and Tunta. In 2004, the PMCA was used again to identify new market opportunities for 
chuño and tunta, and ways to improve the products’ image in different market from the traditional 
ones. This exercise involved some participants from the first application plus chefs and a food-
processing firm manager. It resulted in a new product: clean, selected and bagged chuño, 
marketed under the brand ‘Chuñosa’. In 2005, based on their successful collaboration to date, 
participants established the Bolivian Chuño and Tunta Platform, which later was christened the 
Bolivian Andean Platform (ANDIBOL) (Velasco, et al, 2009).  
ANDIBOL has established links with market agents to develop quality chuño-based products with 
a higher price and to explore the export potential of chuño. The platform has developed a 
strategic plan and has obtained funding to support new projects. Facilitated by PROINPA, the 
platform has 13 core members including R&D organizations, processing firms, and 4 farmers’ 
associations grouped in APEPA (Asociación de Productores Ecológicos Primero Aroma), which 
represents 485 families in 20 communities. 
One of the platforms’ functions is to promote innovation around traditional chuño products. 
Introduction of chuño into urban markets and access to export markets have stimulated demands 
for quality improvement in production and processing. These demands, in turn, have led to work 
with a local manufacturer to develop simple machines for classifying and peeling native potatoes 
and with R&D organizations to improve potato production technology and management of the 
Andean tuber weevil, a major pest in the Andean highlands. Recently a new brand Chef Andino 
was established for marketing products based on chuño as well as Andean grains (flours, instant 
soups, and flakes). On average, farmers now receive 30-40% more for their chuño when sold to 
supermarkets as compared to their traditional market. 
While ANDIBOL has made great strides, it is not without challenges, which include relatively 
weak farmer participation, limited influence of farmer demands on research agendas, the small 
number of participating farmers, and limited volumes of produce marketed.   
Establishing multi-stakeholder platforms 
In the context of the Papa Andina initiative, a multi-stakeholder platform is defined as “a 
space for interaction between different stakeholders who share a resource or common interest 
and interact to improve their mutual understanding, create trust, learn, reach consensus over 
priorities, define roles and engage in joint action” (Thiele et al., 2009). These platforms have 
proven useful for consolidating innovation processes during and after a PMCA, helping to 
maintain dialogue and sustain the innovation dynamics and working relationships among 
stakeholders. Papa Andina and its partners have promoted two types of platform. The first is 
structured along the market chain and brings farmers together with traders, processors, 
retailers, researchers, chefs and others to foster new product development. The second is 
structured around geographically delimited supply areas. In both cases, key functions are 
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communication, translation, and mediation, which require leadership and competent 
facilitation. Platforms can be used to address market coordination problems, helping small-
scale farmers to meet the volume, quality, and timeliness standards demanded of particular 
market chains. They can also help in coordinating the acquisition of inputs, bringing NGOs 
and others in to provide technical support or access to credit (Thiele et al., 2009). Papa 
Andina’s partners have promoted the establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms and 
supported capacity development for platform leadership and facilitation. Although the 
platforms have performed useful innovation, marketing, and advocacy functions, their 
continued operation has often depended on external facilitation and financial support.  
 
Box 3: Linking smallholders to the new agricultural economy: Study of multi-
stakeholder platforms in Ecuador 
A study issued by the FAO (Cavatassi, et al., 2009) analyzes the effects of participation in MSP 
designed to link small potato farmers to the market in Ecuador. Since 2003, INIAP (with funding 
from SDC and support from Papa Andina) has facilitated the implementation of MSP in Ecuador’s 
highlands. In this context, MSP are alliances between farmers and suppliers of agricultural 
services, including research institutes, NGOs, universities, and local governments. The platforms, 
and subsequently the Consortium of Smallholder Potato Producers (CONPAPA), have directly 
linked smallholders’ organizations to higher value markets for their products, including fast food 
restaurants and a company that produces potato chips. An important component of the platforms 
was training provided through Farmer Field Schools, where farmers learned about integrated crop 
management, especially in relation to Andean weevil (Premnotrypes vorax), late blight 
(Phytopthora infestans) and seed management. 
The FAO study evaluated the platforms (between 2003 and 2007 in 2 provinces of the central 
Andes), to determine whether they had successfully linked small farmers to higher-value markets 
and the effects that this has had in terms of yield, profits, use of agricultural chemicals, and agro-
biodiversity.  
The results show that participants in the MSP had higher potato yields and profits than non-
participants. Participants’ yields averaged about one-third higher than those of non-participants, 
and their average selling price was about 40% higher. Participants spent more on inputs, but their 
profits were approximately 6 times greater than those of non-participants.  
Linking to the platforms did not appear to lead to negative consequences from agricultural 
intensification. Participants used less fungicide than non-participants; they used more 
insecticides, but the products were less toxic. Platform participants also made somewhat better 
use of protective equipment (gloves, plastic ponchos, face masks), although its use is still limited. 
The results show that the platforms increased the welfare of participating farmers and suggest 
that they can effectively link small potato producers to the market. The success of the platforms 
can be explained firstly by their intervention along the whole value chain and by reducing 
transaction costs; secondly by the introduction of technological innovations to increase yields; 
and thirdly by an improvement in social capital that is expressed, among other things, as greater 
trust among the actors in the production chain, which enables small-scale producers to overcome 
the obstacles to entering more demanding markets.  
Facilitating policy dialogue 
Innovation in the value chain might stall without policy support and corresponding changes in 
the legal framework. To influence pro-poor policies in the potato sector, Papa Andina’s 
partners have developed two strategies to promote dialogue among researchers, civil society 
organizations, the private sector and political decision-makers. The first strategy is based on 
influencing public opinion through media coverage about the importance of potato value 
chains and the challenges facing them, and bringing these issues to the attention of political 
decision-makers. The second aims to directly engage policy-makers in developing a vision 
and strategy for the potato sector (Devaux et al., 2010). Here, Papa Andina’s role has been to 
draw on methodological expertise developed in other value chains and, with its partners, to 
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adapt and validate these approaches for potato value chains. In establishing spaces for policy 
dialogue, Papa Andina is working on the boundary between politics and science, as referred to 
by Guston (2000). 
Promoting corporate social responsibility 
In value-chain innovation processes, there is always a risk that the lion’s share of the benefits 
will go to large commercial interests. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an entry point 
for addressing the issue of small-scale farmers’ interests with the largest players in the value 
chain. CSR refers to an ethical form of management that takes into account the expectations 
of a company’s stakeholders in order to achieve sustainable development (Thomann et al., 
2009). In a value chain, two important areas for CSR work are: developing a market segment 
willing to pay a premium price for a high-quality, environmentally and socially sustainable 
product; and developing the competitiveness of supplier organizations to reduce asymmetries 
in bargaining power. Papa Andina works to sensitize its partners to CSR, facilitating dialogue 
among large companies, NGOs, and farmer organizations on the application of CSR in the 
market chain. In this way, it facilitates communication and translation among stakeholders 
with differing perspectives, and through mediation it seeks to address asymmetries in power 
and areas of conflicting interest among stakeholders in the value chain (for example, small-
scale producers and large corporate buyers).  
Conducting horizontal evaluations 
The “horizontal evaluation” approach was developed to promote knowledge sharing and 
collective learning within the Papa Andina network (Thiele et al., 2006, 2007; Bernet et al. 
2010). It combines elements of self-assessment and external peer evaluation within the setting 
of a regional workshop. In these workshops, two groups – a local project team and a group of 
peers from other organizations – assess the strengths and weaknesses of an experience 
(usually within a project), and then compare their assessments. Papa Andina’s horizontal 
evaluations have a strong regional knowledge-sharing component because most of the peer 
evaluators come from abroad. There are usually important differences between the self-
assessment conducted by the local project team and the assessment by the external peer group. 
The ensuing dialogue helps both groups fill information gaps and address points of 
disagreement. No attempt is made to reach broad agreement on the merits of the project. 
Instead, the local team formulates recommendations for improving the project, and the peer 
evaluators looks at how they can apply lessons learned during the evaluation in their own 
work back home.  
Participants report that these horizontal evaluation workshops have been extremely useful 
opportunities for learning about the strengths and weaknesses of new R&D approaches, as 
well as for building common visions, language, and understanding among diverse 
stakeholders. As a result of horizontal evaluations, many local project teams have 
significantly altered the way they pursue their innovation agenda. After the workshops, when 
the peer evaluators return home, they often begin to experiment with things they learned 
during the evaluation. For example, after the horizontal evaluation of a PMCA project in Peru, 
Bolivian participants began to work with the PMCA themselves, and subsequently made 
major contributions to the approach. In contrast, Ecuadorian participants did not see the value 
of the PMCA in their context, preferring to focus their energies on strengthening farmer 
organizations.  
Through the use of horizontal evaluations, the Papa Andina Coordination Team provides a 
safe space for frank and open discussion, the airing of disagreements among network 
members, and constructive criticism of work and results. The constructive conflict that takes 
place between national teams has been an important source of social learning, contributing to 
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the development of Papa Andina’s approaches. It has also motivated national teams to 
perform at high levels. For national partners, representing high-profile R&D institutions in the 
Andean region, horizontal evaluation exercises have generated ideas for improving current 
practices, insights into the potential use of new R&D methods, and greater disposition to learn 
and share knowledge with other R&D teams. 
3.4. Types of results achieved 
New R&D approaches 
The most important products of the Papa Andina initiative are the new approaches for 
fostering innovation and strengthening innovation capacity, described above. They can be 
considered innovations in innovation, which Hall (2003:v) refers to as “institutional and 
organizational innovations that emerge as new ways of developing, diffusing, and using new 
knowledge” or “new ways to generate and promote innovation”. Lawrence et al. (2002:281) 
refer to them as “proto-institutions” – new approaches, practices, and norms that transcend a 
particular collaborative relationship and could become new institutions if they diffuse 
sufficiently.  
User guides on the PMCA and horizontal evaluation have been produced (Bernet et al., 2006, 
2010) and many reports have been published on Papa Andina’s approaches, co-produced by 
CIP and R&D organizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Some of the new approaches have 
been applied by other groups in other settings and have the potential to develop into new ways 
of conducting agricultural R&D.  
Through partnerships with other organizations and CIP’s global network, the PMCA has been 
used in a range of market chains in the Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The first pilot 
application of the PMCA outside the Andes was in Uganda, where it was used in the potato, 
sweet potato and vegetable market chains. The Ugandan experience indicates that the 
approach can foster pro-poor innovation in local commodity chains in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Horton, 2008; Horton et al., 2010b). Through alliances with other organizations, including 
Practical Action,12 and in collaboration with CIP’s research divisions and regional projects 
(most notably Alianza Cambio Andino),13 the PMCA has also been applied in market chains 
for milk, coffee, potatoes and other commodities in the Andes. In a project supported by the 
Australian Center for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), the PMCA is being used 
in Indonesia to develop and promote dynamic potato market chains. The horizontal evaluation 
approach has been applied by other regional projects in the Andes, such as the InnovAndes 
and Cambio Andino projects, and some professional evaluators have picked up the approach 
from specialist publications (Thiele et al., 2006; 2007).   
Strengthened innovation capacity 
An important goal of innovation brokering is to strengthen innovation capacity. Actually 
measuring such capacity, however, can be daunting (Horton et al., 2003; Baser and Morgan 
2008; Klerkx et al., 2009).  As noted in Section 2, key aspects of innovation capacity are the 
willingness of groups to work with other stakeholders in innovation processes, openness to a 
range of ideas for diagnosing and solving problems, and the nature of relationships among 
R&D organizations, public authorities, NGOs, private companies, farmers and other 
stakeholders. Although the extent to which Papa Andina has contributed to innovation 
capacity in the region has yet to be measured, illustrative results can be noted:  
                                                
12
 http://practicalaction.org.  
13
 www.cambioandino.org/index.shtml.  
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• researchers who have worked with Papa Andina generally think now more in terms of 
facilitating innovation processes, rather than simply conducting research 
• groups that have worked with Papa Andina (researchers, NGOs, other service 
providers, farmers, or other market chain actors) are generally more open to working 
with others 
• new approaches using native potatoes to improve small-scale farmer livelihoods, 
which were not considered as a priority in the past, are now part of the agenda of R&D 
organizations in the region 
• working with such approaches as the PMCA and muli-stakeholder platforms is now 
common practice among Papa Andina’s partners, and some of the R&D agendas are 
now more market oriented 
• researchers and NGOs that have worked with Papa Andina are more aware of gender 
issues and the need to achieve impact at farmer level 
Commercial, technological, and institutional innovations 
Papa Andina’s experience shows that commercial innovation often stimulates institutional and 
technological innovation. Applications of the PMCA in Bolivia and Peru have led to the 
development of native potato products, including selected “gourmet” native potatoes, 
naturally colored chips, and selected and bagged chuño and tunta, a potato product dehydrated 
using a traditional highlands method (Ordinola et al., 2009). Stakeholder platforms and CSR 
have played useful roles in developing pilot products into economically and socially 
sustainable larger-scale businesses. For example, after the first native potato chips were 
introduced in Lima on a small scale, a large commercial firm developed a higher-quality 
product based on supply from small-scale Andean farmers that is now available all year round 
in supermarkets, is marketed on TV, and is certified as “ethically produced” by an 
independent body. This boom in the native potato market has increased the demand for these 
potatoes, which are grown mainly by small-scale farmers (Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 2. The PMCA as a catalyst for innovation 
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Figure 3. Milestones in the development of the market for native potato chips in Peru 
Commercial development has led to demands for new institutional arrangements, such as 
quality standards for potato products. Stakeholder platforms – themselves institutional 
innovations – have served as springboards for further institutional innovation. In several 
cases, policy dialogue or specific working groups facilitated by Papa Andina and its partners 
have been necessary to consolidate institutional innovations. This was the case, for example, 
in getting native potato varieties included in Peru’s official seed certification system and in 
establishing National Potato Days in Peru and Ecuador (which, in turn, inspired the FAO to 
proclaim 2008 as the International Year of the Potato).  
Commercial innovation has also stimulated innovation in potato production. For example, it 
has improved the seed production system for native potatoes in Peru by including 61 native 
varieties in the national commercial variety list and establishing a seed system aimed at low-
resource potato farmers in Ecuador (FAO, 2006). Research is also being conducted in Peru 
and Bolivia on post-harvest practices to improve the quality and shelf life of selected and 
processed native potatoes in high-quality markets.   
Farm-level impact 
Achieving farm-level impact is not a direct result of the work of an innovation broker (Klerkx 
et al., 2009). An innovation broker needs to interact with partners and stimulate their capacity 
to improve small-scale farmer competitiveness. This applies even more so to the work of 
second-level innovation brokers operating regionally or globally. Nevertheless, Papa Andina’s 
experience provides insights into the impact pathways connecting innovation brokers with 
farm-level changes. The development of market opportunities for potatoes has enabled small-
scale Andean farmers to access higher-value markets for the first time, despite the high 
production and transaction costs associated with scattered smallholder production. In Bolivia, 
the Andibol stakeholder platform has enabled farmers to sell processed chuño in local 
supermarkets and start exporting to Spain (20 to 40% price increase compared to local 
market). In Ecuador, stakeholder platforms have enabled hundreds of small-scale farmers to 
sell their potatoes to fast-food restaurants, resulting in an increase in their yields from 6.3 to 
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8.4 MT/ha and in their gross margins from $US 63 to 259/ha (Cavatassi et al., 2009). In Peru, 
the establishment of a business model incorporating CSR has made it possible for farmer 
organizations in the Central Andes to sell native potatoes on contract to a multinational 
company. Access to markets has motivated farmers to strengthen their organizations and to 
introduce changes in their production and post-harvest practices, such as improvements in pest 
and disease management, seed quality, and the classification of harvested potatoes (Velasco et 
al., 2009). These new practices have increased yields and improved product quality. 
4. Challenges facing Papa Andina 
In this section, we discuss some of the challenges to Papa Andina’s operations and 
sustainability. As outlined in Section 2.2, Klerkx et al. (2009) identified three broad types of 
challenges to effective innovation brokerage: the independence and legitimacy of the broker; 
the ambiguity of the functions performed by the broker; and the issues of funding, evaluation, 
and willingness to pay for innovation brokerage services. Papa Andina has faced challenges in 
each of these areas.  
4.1 .Independence and legitimacy 
The institutional base  
At times, some partners have suspected that Papa Andina’s position has reflected the interests 
of CIP rather than those of the partners or countries involved. For example, some partners in 
Ecuador have questioned Papa Andina’s promotion of the PMCA, of native potatoes, and of 
the participation of private entrepreneurs in driving innovation processes. They did not think 
the PMCA reflected local Ecuadorian needs and circumstances. Another issue relates to 
competition for funding. As both CIP and its national partners have scarce core resources and 
actively seek project funding from donors, and because Papa Andina depends entirely on 
donor project funding, national partners have sometimes viewed Papa Andina as a competitor 
for scarce resources. It is important to note that, in other instances, the close working 
relationship between national organizations and Papa Andina has helped them obtain donor 
funding.  
Donor interests and influence  
As Papa Andina is funded by donor organizations, it sometimes finds it necessary to mediate 
between the interests and priorities of its donors and national partners. For example, in recent 
years, donors have sought to involve the private sector to a greater extent in R&D efforts, but 
researchers in some NARIs view the involvement of the private sector with suspicion. Other 
themes of high priority to many donors, such as gender, empowerment, and partnering with 
NGOs, have not always been the top priority of national partners. In some cases, promoting 
such themes has compromised Papa Andina’s legitimacy as an “honest broker” of innovation 
processes at the national level.  
Governance and intellectual property 
Funding for Papa Andina, including the funds received by national partners, goes through 
CIP. This has led partners to express concern sometimes about the sharing of resources, center 
expenses, and power imbalances. A recent evaluation questioned the current management 
model of Papa Andina as a Partnership Program based at CIP, with one Strategic Partner in 
each country. The recommendation was to establish a broader consortium with a more diverse 
set of Strategic Partners (including NGOs and representatives of the private sector), with CIP 
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playing the role of one among many partners. But there was no specific analysis of the 
capacity of these actors to play a second-level innovation-brokering role.  
There have also been sensitivities related to intellectual property. Papa Andina’s approaches 
draw on the contributions of many actors with different institutional affiliations, but few of the 
contributors have the time and ability to participate in writing up results of Papa Andina’s 
work for publication. Additionally, the publication of Papa Andina’s work is seldom a priority 
for the contributors’ home institutions. These issues have led to problems related to authorship 
and to individual and institutional recognition, which have often required dialogue, 
negotiation, and compromise. 
4.2. Ambiguity of functions 
What is the appropriate research role for Papa Andina? 
While Papa Andina’s main function is that of innovation broker, as a program based at CIP 
and within the CGIAR it is expected to conduct research and produce results of global 
relevance and use. There can be confusion between its brokerage work to support partners in 
local innovation processes and its research work that might not be of direct use to these 
partners. A related issue is that the demand-oriented research focus promoted by Papa Andina 
does not always fit with the traditional bio-physical research on which the CGIAR has built its 
reputation and legitimacy; the emphasis on innovation strategies and processes remains 
controversial in the CGIAR. 
Which boundaries is Papa Andina managing?  
As an innovation broker, Papa Andina works to manage boundaries between organizations 
that can play a role in innovation processes, in order to promote pro-poor innovation with 
potatoes in the Andes. It appears, however, to be doing much more on managing boundaries 
between research entities, other service providers, small-scale farmers and market agents at 
the country level than on managing boundaries between CIP and these groups. Indeed, Papa 
Andina’s Coordination Team has often felt frustrated in its efforts to mobilize CIP expertise in 
support of national innovation processes and to help improve the impact of CIP research in the 
Andes. As we note in the Conclusions section, however, this frustration might stem from 
unreasonable expectations in this area.  
What is Papa Andina’s role relative to the role of national innovation brokers? 
As a program hosted by CIP, Papa Andina is expected to support national and local-level 
innovation processes, not to lead them. Between support and leadership, however, there is a 
broad continuum of types and levels of involvement. Some degree of involvement is essential 
for learning, action research, and effective steering of innovation processes. The challenge of 
operating as a “hands-off” second-level innovation broker is compounded by the fact that 
national and local innovation brokers are generally based at R&D organizations whose 
priorities and core activities could jeopardize the legitimacy of the organization as an “honest 
broker.” For example, an innovation agent based at a national research organization might feel 
under pressure (overt or covert) to channel research contracts to his / her own organization, 
even when another organization might be more appropriate. In such situations, Papa Andina 
sometimes needs to steer processes (particularly with regard to the composition of innovation 
networks) and mediate agreements among parties with conflicting interests and agendas. As a 
result, the first- and second-level innovation brokerage roles sometimes become confused.  
25 
4.3. Evaluation, funding, and willingness to pay 
Dependence on short-term donor project funding 
To date, all Papa Andina’s work has been funded through donor projects with time horizons 
of 4 years or less. SDC funding has been renewed twice and extended over a total of 12 years, 
allowing the Coordination Team to develop good working relationships with national-level 
teams. Nevertheless, the inherently unpredictable nature of donor project funding is not ideal 
for developing innovation brokerage capacity, either at national or international level.  
Limits of objective-based performance measurement 
Recent trends in project management and evaluation that call for the use of logical 
frameworks, SMART indicators, and “hard evidence” of impact put Papa Andina and other 
innovation brokers at a disadvantage compared with projects that produce tangible outputs 
and promise short-term, direct impact on poverty. Papa Andina’s direct results are at the level 
of innovation processes and capacity strengthening, which are inherently difficult to 
document, measure, and attribute to specific actors (Perrin, 2002; Klerkx et al., 2009:415).  
Burden of multiple external evaluations 
Since Papa Andina is now well known for its work and has many donors and stakeholders, it 
has been subjected to numerous external reviews and evaluations. During 2009 and early 2010 
alone, Papa Andina and many of its national partners were asked to participate in seven 
external evaluations conducted for three donor organizations.14 These evaluations diverted the 
scarce human resources of Papa Andina and its partners from brokering innovation processes 
to meeting donors’ accountability needs.  
5. Conclusions 
The Papa Andina case illustrates the useful roles that a Partnership Program attached to a 
CGIAR center can play as a second-level innovation broker and the types of results that can 
be achieved. It also highlights important challenges facing innovation brokers. Here, we 
present some of the main conclusions of our analysis and identify possible ways forward.  
1. Second-level innovation brokers can play useful roles in fostering innovations in 
innovation, strengthening national and local innovation capacities, and promoting 
pro-poor innovation processes.  
Three important roles for second-level innovation brokers are: 
• fostering innovations in innovation through developing and testing new R&D 
approaches, such as the PMCA, that can be useful for articulating demands for 
innovation, forming innovation networks, and managing innovation processes 
• strengthening the capacity of national and local innovation brokers who, in turn, can 
broker local innovation processes and strengthen national innovation capacity  
• creating a dynamic innovation environment that fosters feedback and learning between 
the innovations-in-innovation level and the innovation brokering level linked to 
national contexts and particular value chains 
2. Innovating in innovation processes requires substantial capacity development.  
                                                
14
 There were evaluations of: (1) SDC projects in the area of biodiversity; (2) the SDC agricultural research 
program; (3) the Papa Andina project (financed by SDC); (4) the INCOPA project (financed by SDC); (5) the 
Andean Change Alliance (financed by DFID); (6) the Latin American program of NZAid; and (7) the 
InnovAndes project (financed by NZAid). 
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Our analysis has shown that becoming an effective innovation broker requires the application 
of a complex set of new knowledge, attitudes, and skills. For example, based on assessments 
of experiences with the PMCA in the Andes and Uganda (Devaux et al. 2009; Horton et al., 
2010b), we believe that the successful introduction of the PMCA into new settings requires a 
multi-pronged capacity-development strategy implemented over several months.15 
Implementing such strategies takes time and resources, but they should be seen as an 
investment in innovation capacity that will generate returns for many years. Our analysis 
indicates that the capacities developed, at both individual and innovation-system level, 
continue to be utilized long after the initial PMCA exercise formally ends. In many cases, the 
creative imitations that occur years after the initial efforts are the most important ones.  
When introducing innovation-brokering approaches such as the PMCA to new settings, it 
should be kept in mind that each situation presents a unique combination of socio-economic, 
political, institutional and technological conditions. The approach therefore needs to be 
customized for use in each country and market chain. Institutional sustainability issues should 
be dealt with as priorities from the outset of any process involving the introduction of new 
approaches.  
3. There are tradeoffs between boundary management and innovation brokering.  
Being an effective innovation broker requires being a trusted and reliable “match-maker” to 
ensure that the most appropriate actors are involved in innovation processes. Papa Andina’s 
experience highlights the importance of involving a wide range of national actors with 
different areas of expertise. If an innovation agent is overly concerned with engaging the 
services of his / her host institution, this could hamper the development of local innovation 
capacity.  
4. There are no simple recipes for the organizational locus and structure of a second-
level innovation broker.  
The Papa Andina experience indicates that being hosted by a CGIAR center has both 
advantages and disadvantages. Affiliation with a center can provide easy access to valuable 
technical inputs, expertise, and knowledge. It could also give the innovation broker the 
legitimacy to serve as an “honest broker,” vis-à-vis national actors. A CGIAR center also has 
recognized prestige within the national and international R&D community, which gives the 
innovation broker greater credibility. CGIAR centers can provide administrative and other 
facilities that may be valuable for an innovation broker operating regionally or internationally. 
On the negative side, being hosted by a CGIAR center that works on a limited set of 
commodities or resource areas could constrain the work of the innovation broker. An 
innovation broker based at a center might fall back into a technical, or expert, role, which is 
incompatible with the effective facilitation and brokerage of innovation processes. He / she 
might also be motivated to involve the center in activities for which it is not best suited. The 
center might have high overhead costs. And there could be pressure within a center to give 
                                                
15
 The main components of such a capacity development strategy are: (a) participatory planning and decision-
making involving local actors; (b) negotiation with senior managers in lead R&D organizations to foster 
institutional commitment to the PMCA and to support raising funds for its application; (c) South-South learning 
exchanges via study tours to sites where the PMCA has been successfully used; (d) a comprehensive training 
strategy that includes action-oriented PMCA training workshops, use of the PMCA User Guide and 
complementary training materials, practical hands-on work with the PMCA in commodity groups, and 
backstopping and coaching by experienced PMCA facilitators, involving both face-to-face and virtual 
communications; (e) knowledge sharing among the PMCA practitioners working in different commodity teams; 
and (f) periodic learning-oriented reviews and evaluations to improve the process and document results (Horton 
et al., 2009: 387).  
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priority to research and the production of IPGs, rather than to what are perceived to be less 
valuable “service functions” or “development activities.” The innovation broker must find the 
right balance in responding to both agendas. 
Some authors (for example, Bebbington and Rotondo, 2010:27) have suggested that it would 
be preferable for the innovation broker to be constituted as an independent consortium, but it 
is not clear how such an entity would function.  
5. Traditional objective-based evaluation approaches and the mechanical use of 
logical frameworks are inappropriate for evaluating innovation processes and the 
work of innovation brokers, which are inherently complex and emergent.  
Traditional tools for project planning, management, and evaluation, which have their origins 
in the engineering field, have serious limitations when applied to programs such as Papa 
Andina that seek to promote innovation in varied and dynamic contexts. As Perrin (2002:13) 
noted, “Most attempts at innovation, by definition, are risky and should ‘fail’ – otherwise, 
they are using safe, rather than unknown or truly innovative approaches.” To promote 
innovation, rather than focusing on pre-determined indicators or average results, evaluations 
should identify situations where actual impact has occurred and the reasons for success.  
Similarly, Rogers (2008) noted that logical frameworks pose many challenges when applied to 
the evaluation of complex interventions that have numerous components, operate under 
varying and changing conditions, and have complex cause-effect relationships. These 
characteristics make complex interventions such as Papa Andina difficult to analyse. This has 
important implications not only for evaluating innovation projects, but also for planning and 
managing them. Rogers (2008:44) emphasizes the limitations of logical frameworks for 
performance measurement and the use of management results in complex interventions:  
Particular care should be taken to not imagine that a logic model, however detailed, 
can be used to generate performance measures that can be used formulaically to 
modify implementation and improve performance when interventions have complex 
aspects.  
There are also important methodological issues in the evaluation of capacity development, 
which is an essentially intangible property (Horton et al., 2003; Baser and Morgan, 2008).  
Whereas it will always be inherently difficult for innovation brokers, especially when 
operating at the regional or international level, to document impact at the level of broad 
development goals, it is important for them to develop clear and testable “theories of change” 
or “impact pathways” for their interventions (Douthwaite et al., 2007; Rogers, 2008).  
6. Innovation brokers can improve the linkage between international agricultural 
research and local innovation processes over time.  
Papa Andina’s experiences make it clear that one should not expect such mechanisms as 
innovation brokering and boundary management to serve as a “silver bullet” for linking 
CGIAR research with local needs and innovation processes. These mechanisms could, 
however, contribute to a gradual process of alignment between the research priorities in 
CGIAR centers and locally articulated needs. A logical pathway for influencing the 
international agricultural research agenda would be to strengthen in-country and regional 
innovation capacity, so that local groups could work more effectively with national R&D 
organizations to strengthen the national innovation system and place demands on international 
programs.  
No single entity such as Papa Andina should be expected to have a significant influence on 
the research agenda of its host center. CGIAR centers work on problems of global importance, 
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and core resources are assigned according to global priorities. Potato farmers in the Andes are 
a very small group in the total constituency of potato and sweet potato farmers whose 
problems CIP is mandated to address. CIP has prioritized key problems of global relevance, 
and a problem such as improved storage methods for native potatoes would rank very low in 
any priority-setting exercise driven by total number of beneficiaries or value of net benefits to 
research. 
Nevertheless, if CGIAR centers supported innovation brokers in various parts of the world, 
this could lead to strengthened innovation capacity and improved articulation of technology 
needs and demands, which could exert significant influence on the research agendas of 
national agricultural research institutes and CGIAR centers.  
Another promising avenue for influence is via donor-funded projects. As a very large share of 
centers’ operating budgets comes through donor projects, one strategy would be for 
innovation brokers to seek to influence the priorities of donor-funded projects. This, in turn, 
could influence centers to focus on food security, environmental sustainability and poverty 
reduction linked to development outcomes in partnership with public and private research and 
development partners. 
7. Investment in a network of innovation brokers could yield handsome returns.  
Papa Andina has contributed to an emerging community of R&D professionals with the 
knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to facilitate innovation processes among stakeholders 
and to foster market chain innovation. These professionals represent a potentially valuable 
resource that could be mobilized to facilitate innovation processes on a larger scale. Based on 
our (admittedly limited) experience, we believe that support for the development of a 
community or network of innovation brokers dedicated to facilitating pro-poor agricultural 
innovation would be a high-payoff area for international donor organizations, as well as for 
national and local governments and NGOs that wish to foster pro-poor innovation in 
developing regions.  
References 
Adato, M. and R. Meinzen-Dick. 2007. Agricultural research, livelihoods, and poverty: 
Studies of economic and social impacts in six countries. Baltimore, USA: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.  
Ashley, S., R. Percy and J. Tsui. 2009. Maximising the contribution of agricultural research to 
rural development. Global Donor Platform for Rural Development Discussion Paper 
No. 1. 
(http://www.donorplatform.org/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,11
95/Itemid,98/).  
Baser, H. and P. Morgan. 2008. Capacity, change and performance. ECDPM Discussion 
Paper No 59B. Maastricht, The Netherlands: European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (157 pp). (www.ecdpm.org/dp59B). 
Bebbington, A. and E. Rotondo. 2010. Informe de la evaluacion externa de la fase 3 de Papa 
Andina. Lima, Peru: Papa Andina, CIP.  
Bernet, T., G. Thiele and T. Zschocke. 2006. Participatory Market Chain Approach (PMCA) 
User Guide. Lima, Peru: CIP.  
Bernet, T., A. Devaux, G. Thiele, G. López, C. Velasco, K. Manrique and M. Ordinola. 2008. 
The Participatory Market Chain Approach: Stimulating pro-poor market-chain 
innovation. ILAC Brief 21. Rome, Italy: Institutional Learning and Change Initiative. 
29 
Bernet T., C. Velasco, A. Thomann and J. Andrade-Piedra (eds). 2010. Evaluación 
Horizontal: Aprender colectivamente - Guía de usuario. Lima, Peru: Papa Andina, 
CIP. 
Cash, D., W. Clark, F. Alcock, N. Dickson, N. Eckley, D. Guston, J. Jager and R. Mitchell. 
2003. Knowledge systems for sustainable development. PNAS (100, 14).  
Cavatassi R., M Gonzalez, P. Winters, J Andrade-Piedra, P. Espinosa and G. Thiele. 2009. 
Linking smallholders to the new agricultural economy: An evaluation of the 
Plataformas program in Ecuador. Working Paper No. 09-06. Rome, Italy: FAO, ESA. 
CGIAR Science Council. 2006. Positioning the CGIAR in the research for development 
continuum. Rome, Italy: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat.  
CGIAR Science Council. 2009. Stripe review of social sciences in the CGIAR. Rome, Italy: 
CGIAR Science Council Secretariat. 
CIP. 2004. The CIP vision: Preserving the core, stimulating progress. Lima, Peru: CIP.  
de Janvry, A. and A. Kassam. 2004. Towards a regional approach to research for the CGIAR 
and its partners. Experimental Agriculture (4: 159-178).  
de Souza Silva, J. 2001. Roles of planners and planning. In: G. Gijsbers, W. Janssen, H. 
Hambly Odame and G. Meijerink. Planning agricultural research: A sourcebook. 
Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing/ISNAR (pp 159-169). 
de Souza Silva, J., J. Cheaz, J. Santamaria, M. Mato and A. Leon.  2001. La dimension de 
“estrategia” en la construccion de la sostenibilidad institucional. The Hague, The 
Netherlands: International Services for National Agricultural Research.  
Devaux, A., D. Horton, C. Velasco, G. Thiele, G. López, T. Bernet, I. Reinoso and M. 
Ordinola. 2009. Collective action for market chain innovation in the Andes. Food 
Policy (34, 1: 31-38).  
Devaux, D., M. Ordinola, A. Hibon and R. Flores (eds). 2010. El sector papa en la región 
Andina: Diagnóstico y elementos para una visión estratégica (Bolivia, Ecuador y 
Perú). Lima, Peru: CIP (385 pp). 
Douthwaite, B., S. Alvarez, S. Cook, R. Davies, P. George, J. Howell, R. Mackay and J. 
Rubiano. 2007. Participatory impact pathways analysis: A practical application of 
program theory in research-for-development. Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation 
(22, 2: 127-159).   
Engel, P. and M. Salomon. 2003. Facilitating innovation for development: A RAAKS 
resource box. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: KIT Press.  
Evenson, R. and D. Gollin. 2003. Crop variety improvement and its effect on productivity: 
The impact of international agricultural research. Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing.  
FAO. 2006. Quality declared seed system. FAO Plant Protection and Protection Paper No. 
185. Rome, Italy: FAO. 
Gijsbers, G. 2009. Agricultural innovation in Asia: Drivers, paradigms and performance. PhD 
thesis, Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.  
Guston, D. 2000. Between politics and science: Assuring the integrity and productivity of 
research. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Hall, A. 2003. Innovations in innovation: Reflections on partnership and learning. In: A. Hall, 
B. Yoganand, R. Sulaiman and N. Clark, N. (eds). Post-harvest innovations in 
innovation: Reflections on partnership and learning. Andhra Pradesh, India: ICRISAT.  
Hall, A. 2006. Public-private partnerships in an agricultural system of innovation: Concepts 
and challenges. International Journal of Technology Management and Sustainability 
Development. (5, 1: 3-20).  
30 
Harwood, R., F. Place, A. Kassam and H. Gregersen. 2006. International public goods 
through integrated natural resources management research in CGIAR partnerships. 
Experimental Agriculture (42:4) 375-397.  
Hazell, P. 2008. An assessment of the impact of agricultural research in South Asia since the 
Green Revolution. Rome, Italy: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat.  
Horton, D. 2008. Facilitating pro-poor market chain innovation: An assessment of the 
participatory market chain approach in Uganda. Social Sciences Working Paper No. 2008-
1. Lima, Peru: CIP  
Horton, D., A. Alexaki, S. Bennet-Lartey, K. Noële Brice, D. Campilan, F. Carden, J. de 
Souza Silva, Le Thanh Duong, I. Kadar, A. Maestrey Boza, I. Kayes Muniruzzaman, J. 
Perez, M. Somarriba Chang, R. Vernooy and J. Watts. 2003. Evaluating capacity 
development: Experiences from research and development organizations around the 
world. The Netherlands: ISNAR/CTA and Canada: IDRC (also available in French). 
Horton, D., G. Prain, and G. Thiele. 2009. Perspectives on partnership: A literature review. 
Social Sciences Working Paper No. 2009-3. Lima, Peru: CIP. 
Horton, D., G. Thiele and G. Prain. 2010a. Perspectives on partnership: Highlights of a 
literature review. ILAC Brief No. 25. Rome, Italy: Institutional Learning and Change 
Initiative. 
Horton, D., B. Akello, L. Aliguma, T. Bernet, A. Devaux, B. Lemaga, D. Magala, S. Mayanja, 
I. Sekitto, G. Thiele and C. Velasco. 2010b. Developing capacity for pro-poor 
innovation: The case of the Participatory Market Chain Approach in Uganda. Journal 
of International Development (22, 2).  
Howells, J. 2006. Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation. Research Policy 
(35, 5: 715-728). 
IAASTD. 2009. Agriculture at a crossroads: International assessment of agricultural 
knowledge, science and technology for development, global report. Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press.  
Kelly, T., J. Ryan and H. Gregersen. 2008. Enhancing ex-post impact assessment of 
agricultural research: The CGIAR experience. Research Valuation (17, 3).  
Klerkx, L., A. Hall and C. Leeuwis. 2009. Strengthening agricultural innovation capacity: Are 
innovation brokers the answer? International Journal of Agricultural Resources, 
Governance and Ecology (8, 5/6: 409-438).  
Klerkx, L., N. Aarts and C. Leeuwis. 2010. Adaptive management in agricultural innovation 
systems: The interactions between innovation networks and their environment. 
Agricultural Systems (102: 390-400).  
Kristjanson, P., R. Reid, N. Dickson, W. Clark, , D. Romney, R. Puskur, S. MacMillan and D. 
Grace. 2009. Linking international agricultural research knowledge with action for 
sustainable development. PNAS (106, 13: 5047-5052).  
Lawrence, T., C. Hardy and N. Phillips. 2002. Institutional effects of inter-organizational 
collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions. Academy of Management Journal 
45, 1: 281-290. 
Lele, U. 2004. The CGIAR at 31: An independent meta-evaluation of the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
McNie, E., M. van Noordwijk, W. Clark, N. Dickson, N., Sakuntaladewi, N., Suyanto, L. 
Joshi, B. Leimona, K. Hairiah and N. Khususiyah. 2008. Boundary organizations, 
objects, and agents: Linking knowledge with action in agroforestry watersheds. Report 
of a workshop held in Batu, Malang, East Java, Indonesia, 26–29 July 2007. Working 
31 
Paper, Center for International Development at Harvard University. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Meinzen-Dick, R., A. Devaux and I. Antezanna. 2009 (in press). Underground assets: Potato 
biodiversity to improve the livelihoods of the poor. International Journal of 
Agricultural Sustainability (7, 4).  
Ordinola, M., T. Bernet and K. Manrique. 2007. T’ikapapa: Linking urban consumers and 
small scale Andean producers with potato biodiversity. Lima, Peru: CIP (56 pp). 
Ordinola, M., A. Devaux, K. Manrique, C. Fonseca and A. Thomann. 2009. Generating 
innovations for the competitive development of potato in Peru. Memoria del 15 th 
Triennial Symposium of the International Society for Tropical Roots Crops, November  
2009, Lima, Peru.  
Perrin, B. 2002. How to – and how not to – evaluate innovation. Evaluation (8, 13: 13-28). 
Reid, R., D. Nkedianye, M. Said, D. Kaelo, M. Neselle, O. Makui, L. Onetu, S. Kiruswa, N. 
Kamuaro, P. Kristjanson, J. Ogutu, S. BurnSilver, M. Goldman, R. Boone, K. Galvin, 
N. Dickson and W. Clark. 2009. Evolution of models to support community and policy 
action with science: Balancing pastoral livelihoods and wildlife conservation in 
savannas of East Africa. PNAS Early Edition. (www.pnas.org/).  
Rogers, P. 2008. Using programme theory to evaluate complicated and complex aspects of 
interventions. Evaluation (14, 29: 29-48).  
Schneider, A. 2007. Why do some boundary organizations result in new ideas and practices 
and others only meet resistance? The American Review of  Public Administration (39, 
1: 60-79).  
Szogs, A. 2008. The role of mediator oreganisations in the making of innovation systems in 
least developed countries: evidence from Tanzania. International Journal of 
Technology and Globalisation (4, 3: 223-237). 
Scoones, I. and J. Thompson, 2009. Farmer first revisited: Innovation for agricultural research 
and development. Bourton on Dunsmore, UK: Practical Action Publishing. 
Thiele, G., A. Devaux, C. Velasco and K. Manrique. 2006. Horizontal evaluation: Stimulating 
social learning among peers. ILAC Brief No. 13. Rome, Italy: Institutional Learning 
and Change Initiative. 
Thiele, G., A. Devaux, C. Velasco and D. Horton. 2007. Horizontal evaluation: Fostering 
knowledge sharing and program improvement within a network. American Journal of 
Evaluation  (28, 4) 493-508.  
Thiele, G., A. Devaux, I. Reinoso, H. Pico, F. Montesdeoca, M. Pumisacho, C. Velasco, P. 
Flores, R. Esprella and K. Manrique. 2009. Multi-stakeholder platforms for innovation 
and coordination in market chains. Paper presented at the 15th Triennial International 
Symposium of the International Society for Tropical Root Crops (ISTRC), November 
2009, Lima, Peru. 
Thomann, A., A. Devaux, M. Ordinola, M. Cuentas, P. Urday, M. Sevilla and J. Andrade. 
2009. Native potato market chain and poverty reduction: Innovation around Corporate 
Social Responsibility. Paper presented at the 15th Triennial International Symposium 
of the International Society for Tropical Root Crops (ISTRC), November 2009, Lima, 
Peru. 
Vanloqueren, G. and P. Baret. 2009. How agricultural research systems shape a technological 
regime that develops genetic engineering but locks out agroecological innovations. 
Research Policy (38: 971-983).  
Velasco, C., R. Esprella, P. Flores and H. Foronda. 2009. Dealing with innovation in response 
to market opportunities and poor farmers’ needs: The case of the Bolivian Andean 
32 
Platform. Paper presented at the 15th Triennial International Symposium of the 
International Society for Tropical Root Crops (ISTRC), November 2009, Lima, Peru. 
Winch, G. and R. Courtney. 2007. The organisation of innovation brokers: An international 
review. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management (19, 6: 747-763).  
World Bank, 2007. Enhancing agricultural innovation: How to go beyond the strengthening of 
research systems. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
